The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

George W. Roberts; III—Some Questions in Epistemology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 37–60, https://doi.org/10.

George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...

Cet article propose une réinterprétation du système des arts de Hegel. Il montre que ce système contient deux affirmations apparemment contradictoires. D’une part, Hegel soutient que les différents arts ont leurs propres potentialités et accomplissements, irréductibles les uns aux autres. D’autre part, il affirme que ces potentialités et accomplissements ne peuvent être compris que dans le cadre d’une conception d’ensemble de l’art pris en totalité. Loin de d’intégrer l’art comme un tout dans son système, Hegel combine une conception des différents (...) arts comme pratiques autonomes avec l’idée que les différents arts (en tant qu’accomplissements de ce qu’est l’art) sont des contributions au sein de contextes historico-culturels dans lesquels individus et groupes interagissent avec eux. Selon Hegel, les différents arts entrent dans des échanges dynamiques les uns avec les autres sur la base de leur enjeu commun, à savoir de fournir des impulsions productives au mouvement autonome des pratiques historico-culturelles. Les réflexions de Hegel sur l’art offrent ainsi une perspective sur l’unité hétérogène des arts. (shrink)

Opposition: Obedience and authority in Exodus 32-34 / George W. Coats -- The theological significance of contradiction within the Book of the Covenant / Paul D. Hanson -- The renewed authority of Old Testament wisdom for contemporary faith / Wayne Sibley Towner -- A stylistic study of the priestly creation story / Bernhard W. Anderson -- "I will not cause it to return" in Amos 1 and 2 / Rolf P. Knierim.

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

The mother discipline of organisational behaviour has deep roots in psychology, particularly industrial and organisational psychology. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that new and theoretically incommensurate findings involving human moral behaviour have been met with calls for a more psychologically informed investigation of ethical behaviour in organisational contexts (DeCremer and Tenbrunsel, 2012; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2009). This project, aimed at a fuller understanding of the psychology of ethical behaviour, typically falls under the label of Organisational Ethical Behavior (OEB).

Continues the ongoing dialogue between religion and science. In this volume, the author has focused on scientific or science-based technology rather than just the significance of 'pure science'. This complex focus covers a number of issues including scientific theory, public policy, ethical consideration, cosmology, theological conundrums and the age-old issues of the meaning of human life and its fulfillment.

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

New Essays on the Nature of Rights. Edited by Mcbride Mark.

To have dominion over the world is heady power, and the temptation to extend that world power into divine power can be unbearable. What happens then?

Are works of art to be conceived as thought experiments? To answer this question one has to explain what thought experiments are. I argue that thought experiments consist of contrafactual scenarios which are conceptually articulated, whereby the scenarios in question are developed in a concise way. In the case of works of art this is not so. If works of art consist of contrafactual scenarios these scenarios are not developed concisely, even if works of art present a constellation of just (...) a few elements. The reason for this is that each work of art establishes a specific language. Such a language cannot be simply grasped, like a scenario in a thought experiment – it has to be followed mimetically by the recipients. So works of art function differently from thought experiments and are – even though closely related – not to be conceived as thought experiments. (shrink)